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Claudia Geist 
Three worlds of marriage effects? Gendered 
marriage earning differences in the United States, 
Germany, and Sweden 
Gibt es drei verschiedene Welten der Ehe-Effekte? 
Geschlechterspezifische Einkommensunterschiede von Verheirateten in 
den Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland und Schweden 
 
Abstract: 
Being married is associated with many advantages.
However, we do not know enough about the actu-
al impact of entering marriage on individuals’
earnings, especially for women. In this paper, I
examine the immediate and the short-term impact
of marriage on men’s and women’s earnings in
the United States, Germany, and Sweden. Study-
ing the impact of marriage on earnings in three
distinct socio-political settings provides insights
into the context dependency of the link between
marriage and earnings. Fixed effects models show
that marriage transitions are not associated with
women’s earnings in the United States and Swe-
den. For German women, I find an earnings pen-
alty for marriage. Once I adjust for selection into
employment, I find that employed German wom-
en with low employment propensities may expe-
rience instantaneous earnings boosts when they
enter marriage, but that among women who are 
more firmly attached to the labor market, there is
a short-term marriage penalty. For men in all
three countries, I find no effect of marital transi-








Key words: marriage, earnings, Germany, Swe-
den, United States of America, selection, women,
men 
 Zusammenfassung: 
Verheiratet zu sein wird mit vielen Vorteilen in
Verbindung gebracht, aber wir wissen nicht genug
über den tatsächlichen Effekt des Eheeintritts auf
individuelles Einkommen, insbesondere für Frau-
en. In diesem Beitrag werden die unmittelbaren
und kurzfristigen Effekte untersucht, die eine Ver-
ehelichung auf die Einkommen von Männern und
Frauen in den USA, in Deutschland und in Schwe-
den hat. Die Untersuchung des Einkommenseffekts
der Ehe in drei unterschiedlichen sozial-politischen 
Settings ermöglicht Einsichten in die Kontextab-
hängigkeit des Zusammenhangs zwischen Heirat
und Einkommen. Mit Fixed-Effects-Modellen wird 
aufgezeigt, dass der Übergang zur Ehe weder in
den Vereinigten Staaten noch in Schweden mit 
dem Einkommen von Frauen zusammenhängt,
während deutsche Frauen dadurch Einkommens-
einbußen hinnehmen müssen. Kontrolliert man je-
doch die Selektionseffekte bei der Aufnahme einer
Beschäftigung, so kommt man zu dem Ergebnis,
dass erwerbstätige Frauen in Deutschland mit nied-
riger Beschäftigungsneigung bei Ehe-Eintritt um-
gehend Einkommenszuwächse erfahren, dass aber
Frauen, die stärker in den Arbeitsmarkt eingebun-
den sind, dann kurzfristig negativ sanktioniert wer-
den. Für die Männer in den drei Ländern kommt es 
jedoch beim Übergang in die Ehe zu keinen Ein-
kommenseffekten, wenn deren Beschäftigungs-
wahrscheinlichkeit berücksichtigt wird.   
 
Schlagwörter: Ehe, Einkommen, Deutschland, 
Schweden, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika, Se-
lektion, Frauen, Männer 
 C. Geist: Three worlds of marriage effects? 
 
254
Marriage is associated with many economic advantages as well as better physical and 
mental health and improved social networks for both men and women (Ross/Mirowsky/ 
Goldsteen 1990; Sigle-Rushton/McLanahan 2002; Simon 2002; L. J. Waite 1995; L. J. 
Waite/Gallagher 2000). For men, being married is associated with higher wages in a 
broad range of countries, but the evidence for women is less clear (Geist, unpublished 
document).  
These results provide an important snapshot of existing marriage earnings differences, 
yet they do not tell us about the impact of entering marriage on individuals’ earnings. In 
this paper, I examine the immediate and short-term impact of marriage on men’s and 
women’s earnings in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. A longitudinal and com-
parative approach has two advantages. First, the longitudinal nature of the data allows me 
to account for unmeasured individual characteristics that may be associated with both the 
chances of entering marriage and earnings. Second, examining the impact of marriage on 
earnings for men and women in comparative perspective provides me with three distinct 
institutional settings in which marriage earnings differences can manifest themselves, and 
as a result, this study provides important insights into the possible context variability of 
the short-term impact of marriage on individuals’ earnings. 
In this paper, I focus on the immediate and short-term impact of marriage entry on 
men’s and women’s individual earnings in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. My 
study addresses both selection into employment and, to a lesser extent, into marriage, and 
is therefore uniquely suited to illustrate the net effect of marriage for women and men in 
the three different contexts. Although even longitudinal data cannot fully assess the causal 
nature of the relationship of the association between marriage and earnings I use the 
phrase “marriage effect” to refer to the association between a change in marital status and 
a change in earnings. 
Specifically, this study addresses three broad research questions: 
 
1. What are the short-term effects of marriage on earnings for men and women’s earn-
ings? 
2. To what extent is the impact of marriage on earnings caused by underlying differ-
ences in individual and labor market characteristics between those who enter and do 
not enter marriage? 
3. Is there evidence that the impact of marriage on earnings varies across contexts for 
men and women? 
 
In the next sections, I provide a brief description of the literature on marriage earnings 
differences, with a specific emphasis on issues of selectivity in employment and into mar-
riage. I also discuss the importance of using a comparative perspective for situating the 
association between marriage and earnings in a broader context. I then describe the data 
and analytic strategy, before turning to results and conclusions.  
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Marriage entry and earnings 
There are numerous economic and social advantages associated with marriage that have 
been discussed elsewhere (Ribar 2004; Linda J. Waite/Gallagher 2000), but not enough is 
known about the short-term economic impact of entering marriage for men and women in 
comparative perspective. Marriage, for heterosexual couples, is a highly gendered institu-
tion that comes with different sets of expectation for husbands and wives. The role of 
husband is closely associated with that of a breadwinner, whereas being a wife, despite 
relatively high levels of labor force participation among married women cross-nationally, 
is not conditioned to labor market success in the same sense.  
Research on men has identified a marriage earnings advantage and a specific earnings 
benefit of marriage entry (Bellas 1992; Cohen/Haberfeld 1991; Kaufman/Uhlenberg 
2000; Nakosteen/Zimmer 1997), but recent work by Killewald and Lundberg (2017) has 
cast doubt on the causality of this association. For women, Light (2004) finds that while 
household income increases when US women start to cohabit or enter marriage, women’s 
earnings suffer. Korenman and Neumark (1992), however, find no direct effect of enter-
ing marriage on women’s wages. Some studies examine marriage earnings premiums in 
longitudinal samples outside the United States (e.g, Coppin 2000), but to my knowledge, 
no studies include an examination of marriage earnings gaps for both men and women in 
multiple countries.  
Economic Selection 
Some studies show that men’s employment and favorable economic circumstances in-
crease the chance of marriage for men (D. T. Lichter/Kephart/McLaughlin/Landry, 1992; 
Daniel T. Lichter/Landry 1991; Oppenheimer 1994; Smock/Manning 1997; Speare/Gold-
scheider 1987). The observation that men with higher earnings potential are also more 
likely to enter marriage than those with lower earnings potential has been offered as a 
central explanation of the marriage bonus for men (Blackburm/Korenman 1994). This 
implies that observed wage differences between married and unmarried men are ex-
plained by the fact that highly productive men with increased earnings potential have bet-
ter chances of both entering marriage and remaining married, thus raising the average 
earnings level among those who are married (Nakosteen/Zimmer 1997). Killewald and 
Lundberg (2017) argue that marriage and rising earnings are merely co-occurring during 
the transition to the life course for men in the United States.  
Recent empirical evidence implies that increased earnings power and economic inde-
pendence may also increase women’s chances of entering marriage under certain circum-
stances (Ono 2003; Sassler/Schoen 1999). However, the increased chance of entering 
marriage may be partially offset by the fact that women’s financial autonomy reduces the 
pressure to get married.  
Studies have addressed the issue that the marriage earnings gap may be due to selec-
tion by using longitudinal data. This allows the researcher to examine the effect of mar-
riage entry within an individual’s earnings trajectory, rather than simply comparing earn-
ings across two possibly very different groups of individuals. However, examining the ef-
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fect of marriage on earnings is subject to yet another selection mechanism that has largely 
been ignored. Earnings and marriage earnings effects can only be observed for men and 
women who actually are employed and have earnings. As such, we know little about how 
marriage may affect those who are not employed, in the event they “beat the odds” and 
enter marriage. While I am unable to solve the issue in the present study, I take into ac-
count employment propensity in addition to the standard human capital controls for mod-
eling earnings. This, combined with my comparative approach allows me to examine the 
extent to which the impact of marriage on earnings is context specific with respect to na-
tional policy differences, but I can also differentiate between individuals who can be ex-
pected to have a stable employment over the life course and those who may be more at 
risk for unemployment. This is particularly important for men, for whom stable employ-
ment and high levels of human capital have been described as a precondition for marriage 
formation. 
Attitudes as source of differences 
Of course, economic circumstances are not the only way in which those who enter mar-
riage may be different from those who remain single. Favorable attitudes towards mar-
riage are associated with a greater likelihood of marriage net of other factors 
(Sassler/Schoen 1999). The results reported by Sassler and Goldscheider (2004) suggest a 
decreased role of economic considerations, like men’s employment, in the marriage deci-
sion, and an increase in the importance of values. Non-economic characteristics that make 
men more attractive spouses may also make them more attractive employees who are re-
warded with higher earnings by employers. Those who are married have stronger prefer-
ences for stability and a reduced tendency to engage in high-risk behavior compared to 
singles, especially among men.  
Women’s positions in the labor market have undergone more rapid changes than the 
gendered relationships between potential spouses. Nevertheless, we must account for the 
possibility that non-economic characteristics that make individuals more attractive spous-
es may also shape their earnings potential in complex ways. In my study, I exclude the ef-
fect of differences in (stable) underlying characteristics between married and unmarried 
individuals by examining marriage effects within, rather across individuals.  
Productivity differences 
For men, the marriage wage gap has also been attributed to the productivity-enhancing 
characteristics of marriage. Marriage is thought to increase productivity through improved 
physical and mental health. Along with the emotional benefits associated with marriage 
researchers cite household specialization as a crucial mechanism through which marriage 
enhances men’s productivity (Chun/Lee 2001). The (male) main breadwinner spends 
more time and effort on employment, resulting in higher earnings, and the female partner 
focuses on domestic production, even if she continues to be employed (Becker 1981). Ko-
renman and Neumark (1991) find that men’s wages increase faster after marriage, they 
receive more frequent promotions and better performance evaluations (see also Gray 
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1997). However, based on their findings, Cornwell and Rupert (1997) and Hersch and 
Stratton (2000) doubt that marriage enhances productivity through specialization. For 
women, research suggests that marriage is associated with changes consistent with the 
specialization approach: marriage has been shown to increase domestic labor and may 
lead to both lower levels of participation and productivity in paid work (Becker 1981; 
Kalleberg/Rosenfeld 1990), with the possibility of subsequent wage loss. However, evi-
dence has also cast doubt on both selection and specialization arguments, and further sug-
gest that other mechanisms are at play (de Linde Leonard/Stanley 2015). 
The policy context of marriage  
Public policy often supports marriage, for example through explicit financial or institu-
tional support, but potentially even more through framing of marriage as a highly valued 
family form. Policy constellations shape the meaning of marriage and the very circum-
stances in which marriage occurs – most notably, the centrality of the male breadwinner 
role, the views towards women’s labor force participation, and the role and importance of 
marriage vary cross-nationally (Alwin/Braun/Scott 1992; Crompton 1999; Esping-
Anderson 1999). Countries have different sets of social institutions, such as labor market 
policies, gender relations, and existing or lack of state support for certain family forms.1 
State policy shapes the relationship between states, markets, families, and individuals. In 
the presence of a strong government safety net, unemployment may not have a dramatic 
impact on people’s lives, including their marriage behavior. The same may not be the 
case, however, in a policy context where unemployment that is more than short-term is 
often associated with poverty (Gangl 2004). The meaning of economic prosperity, pov-
erty, or employment is affected by the institutional setting.  
Framing family and gender ideologically 
One of the most popular categorical frameworks for comparative research on advanced 
western economies relies on Esping-Anderson’s (1990) classification of welfare regimes 
into social-democratic, liberal, and conservative policy clusters. Esping-Anderson focuses 
on the relationship between states, markets, and families (Esping-Andersen 1990) as well 
as the dimension of gender relations more explicitly (Esping-Anderson 1999).  
Social democratic regimes actively advocate gender equity. The Swedish state, for 
example, understands itself as instrumental towards that goal (Sainsbury 1996). The state 
promotes female labor force participation and equal pay. Liberal regimes’ focus on indi-
vidual and gender equality is not as actively pursued through government activity as it is 
in the social democratic regimes. The liberal country cluster has been characterized as 
taking a “laissez-faire” approach with only limited state interventions in both the econom-
ic and private spheres. This results in a generally neutral stance towards issues such as 
family and gender, and an emphasis on the regulatory power of markets. In liberal re-
                                                        
1 Of course, there is a reciprocal relationship between public attitudes and state policies.  
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gimes, individualism supports the idea of equality of men and women through the univer-
sal breadwinner model which promotes both men’s and women’s full-time employment.  
In contrast to the active support for egalitarian gender relations in countries that are part 
of the social democratic policy cluster, and the more passive support for egalitarianism of 
the liberal tradition, conservative regimes actively support traditional gender roles. Wom-
en are discouraged from participating (full-time) in the labor market, as they are seen as 
“naturally” responsible for caring for the home and the family (Mósesdóttir 2000). An-
other difference between the conservative and the liberal policy groups is that this familis-
tic approach does not target the individual (like in liberal regimes), but the family as a 
“unit.” Closely tied to this concept, however, are strong ideas about the nature of families. 
The male breadwinner model, which is prevalent in many conservative countries, assumes 
or encourages the notion that the husband supports the family and the wife focuses on 
domestic responsibilities. Conservative policy seeks to maintain existing structures by 
supporting a traditional division of labor with an expansive set of social and economic 
policies, particularly seeking to strengthen the traditional family.  
State policies target both employment patterns and family formation, but I argue that they 
also affect the link between family and employment. States have several policy tools at 
their disposal. When it comes to the areas of family and labor market policy, taxation is 
often considered as one of the most powerful tools to set incentives. Dingeldey (2001) 
suggests, however, that taxation systems alone do not clearly shape employment patterns 
in Europe. Her results indicate that coordinated policy packages can affect individuals’ 
labor force participation if a certain family participation model is favored. There is evi-
dence that in policy contexts where women’s employment is not supported, women’s 
overall participation rates and women’s full-time employment rates are lower.  
In the “three worlds” scheme, labor market institutions in Germany, the ideal type of the 
conservative regime, may incorporate mechanisms that reflect the strong male breadwin-
ner model by favoring married men. For example, tax-splitting makes income inequality 
between spouses economically advantageous. Typically, the higher earning partner is 
taxed at a lower rate compared to the lower earner. This has the potential to further de-
press the labor supply especially of wives. This also suggests that men’s economic cir-
cumstances are crucial in predicting transitions into marriage. The United States repre-
sents the prototypical liberal regime, where full-time employment is promoted for men 
and women, regardless of marital or parenthood status. Consequently, family status 
should play less of a role in shaping employers’ responses. In Sweden, the exemplar of a 
social democratic regime, principles of universalism and egalitarianism might be expected 
to inhibit or limit gender differences in the labor market effects of marriage formation, 
especially given the great social acceptability of cohabitation.  
More recently, scholars have suggested that three policy typologies may not be 
enough, even to capture the policy circumstances (i.e. Ferrera 1996). However, even with 
new taxonomies, Germany, the United States, and Sweden remain understood as three 
differing contexts that are meaningful to compare (Aisenbrey/Evertsson/Grunow 2009). 
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The current study: Cross-national differences in the effect of marriage 
There is cross-national variation with respect to the centrality and nature of marriage as 
indicated by cross-national variation in marriage rates, average age at first marriage, and 
marriage dissolution rates (2017). Given cross-national differences in support for (and 
women’s rates of) labor force participation, the political support for traditionally gendered 
marriage, and differences in gender equality and women’s power, we can expect that 
there is also variation in the extent to which marriage entry affects women’s earnings. In 
this study, I focus on three countries that are ideal types of Esping-Anderson’s (1990) 
three welfare state categorizations. There are many different ways to assess gender equali-
ty within and across society. A cross-national comparison of the association between mar-
riage and earnings for both men and women allows us insights into the relevance of mar-
riage as an institution that may or may not further perpetuate inequality across policy con-
texts.  
The United States is the prime example of the liberal policy regime, and has a very 
high marriage rate (crude marriage rate in 2000 is 8.42); at the end of the 1990s U.S. Cen-
sus cohabitation estimates in the United States reached just under 10% for of all never 
married individuals (Casper/Cohen, 2000). As of 2011, about 12% of 20-34 year olds 
were cohabiting with a partner. 
Germany is an example of a conservative corporate country, with below European 
average crude marriage rates of 5.12, and Sweden represents a social democratic country 
with a low marriage rate of 4.5.2 Official tracking of cohabitation in Europe remains lack-
ing, but recent sources suggest that cohabitation is common in both Germany and Swe-
den, with 17% and 29% (respectively) of 20-34 year olds in 2011 living with a partner 
(but not married) (OECD Family Database, table SF3.3 A). State policy that encourages a 
traditional division of labor between husband and wife may favor men’s incomes and dis-
count women’s earnings in the allocation of housework (Geist 2005). I thus expect that in 
conservative policy contexts, the male bonus and the earnings penalty for women that are 
associated with marriage are particularly large. I expect this not only as a direct result of 
government policies, but also as a consequence of employers’ unconscious (or conscious) 
discrimination whose action follow commonly shared policy goals (of favoring married 
men and discouraging women’s employment) at the company level.  
DiPrete (2002) examines life course risks and mobility consequences in the United 
States, Germany, and Sweden and points out that state policies may buffer the impact of 
negative life events. Gangl (2004) shows that this is partially due to unemployment insur-
ance. Germans experience more stable income and career trajectories, compared to indi-
viduals in the United States. Finally, McManus and DiPrete (2000) find that variety of life 
events are associated with more instability in household income associated in the United 
States compared to Germany, partly because of greater turbulence in earnings in the Unit-
ed States.  
Based on these findings and the variation regarding the centrality of marriage in state 
policy in the three countries, one could expect the marriage advantage for men and the 
marriage penalty for women to be largest in the conservative policy context of Germany. 
                                                        
2 Marriage rates were obtained from data from Geist (2017). 
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This type of policy context is the most supportive of marriage and traditional division of 
labor within marriage. Since there is comparatively less pressure to enter marriage in so-
cial democratic countries, and there are few policies directed towards influencing the link 
between family and economy in liberal countries3, smaller marriage earnings differences 
may be expected here. 
DiPrete and McManus’ (2000) examination of the long term household income and 
individual earnings consequences of life changes in the United States and Germany, how-
ever, fails to find that union formation is associated with greater earnings benefits for 
German men or greater disadvantages for German women. Instead, they find that adding a 
partner reduces women’s labor earnings in the United States over a 5- and 7-year span, 
and increases men’s labor earnings over the 5-year period. In Germany, neither women’s 
nor men’s labor earnings are affected over the 5- and 7-year time span.  
Data, methods, and measures 
In this paper, I use panel data from the United States, Germany, and Sweden. For the 
United States, I use data from 1986 through 1996 from the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID).4 For Germany, I use data from the German Socioeconomic Panel 
(GSOEP) for the years 1984 to 20015. I use measures from the Cross-National Equivalen-
cy File (CNEF) to augment the US and German data sets, which has been established to 
make measures from the PSID and the GSOEP comparable across countries. For Sweden, 
I use the 1996 and 1998 waves of the Panel Study of Market and Nonmarket Activities 
(HUS).6 Although the time frames do not perfectly overlap, they are close enough to al-
low comparability. To maximize comparability with the Swedish data I did not choose 
more recent waves of the German and US data. I restrict my analyses to those who are ei-
ther single or married, excluding those who are separated, divorced, or widowed. For the 
US and German data, I can exclude those who report that their current marriage is not 
their first. I restrict my analyses to adults between the ages of 22 and 45, the age range 
when most marriages occur.7 For analyses of the marriage earnings advantage, I restrict 
my sample to those who are employed and report positive earnings.8  
                                                        
3 There has been a discussion about providing marriage incentives in the United States. However, this 
discussion and the limited number of policies that exist have mostly targeted poor single women, ra-
ther than the entire population.  
4 I model marriage earnings effects for years following 1988, since experience and tenure measures 
are only available starting those years. I use data for 1986 and 1987 to create short-term marriage 
history.  
5 I model marriage earnings effects for the years starting with 1986, but I use the marriage infor-
mation for the year 1984 and 1985 to create the short-term marriage history.  
6 Other waves exist, but data and codebooks are only available in Swedish for earlier years. 
7 Because of the low average age at marriage in the United States, I chose 22 years as lower bound for 
the age range, to maximize the transitions into first marriage.  
8 Due to the challenge of assessing earnings for self-employed individuals they are excluded. 
Zeitschrift für Familienforschung, 29. Jahrg., Heft 3/2017, S. 253-276 261 
 
Analytic strategy 
In this paper, I use a combination of two methods to identify marital status earnings dis-
parities, fixed effects models and propensity score matching. I first estimate the effect of 
marriage on earnings separately for men and women in each of the three countries. I do so 
by using a fixed effects model. In the analyses of individual level, data analysts face the 
challenge to discern the effect of a measure of interest from unmeasured heterogeneity. 
When panel data are available, the fixed effects model is an elegant and conservative way 
to address the problem of unmeasured time-invariant heterogeneity (Baum 2006; Greene 
2000). In the fixed-effects estimation, every observation is observed from the unit aver-
age, in my case the individual cross-year average. As such, the fixed-effects model re-
moves all between-unit variation from the data and it cannot estimate coefficients for 
time-invariant characteristics.  
By estimating a fixed effects regression with marital status as the sole dependent vari-
able, I can ascertain the effect of marital transitions on earnings net of unmeasured, stable 
characteristics. I use two different measures of marital status. One reflects marital status 
in the current year. Thus any earnings effect associated with this measure points to an in-
stantaneous earnings impact of marriage. I also estimate models for both the German and 
US data that examine the impact of being married in the current or previous two years on 
earnings, reflecting a more general short-term effect of marriage on earnings. For the 
Swedish data, I have less information about marital history, and, therefore, I estimate a 
fixed effects model that only includes the effect of marital status on earnings. I distinguish 
between married and unmarried individuals, which includes singles and cohabiters. 
In a second step, I also account for changes in the individual and labor market charac-
teristics, to obtain the net effect of entering marriage on earnings, including the measures 
for the German and US data described above. This allows me to isolate the impact of mar-
ital status change net of other changes that may have occurred in individuals’ lives.  
Although other recent studies have used sophisticated fixed effects models to strin-
gently test causal association between married and earnings for men in the United States 
(Killewald/Lundberg 2017), they have not accounted for the fact that we only observe 
earnings for those who are currently employed. In a third step, I further adjust for individ-
uals’ employment propensity for the US and German respondents, to examine whether se-
lection into employment is at the heart of any of the observed marriage earnings differ-
ences (ibd.). To obtain individual earnings propensities, I use propensity score matching 
techniques, implemented in the “pscore" command in Stata. In general, propensity match-
ing is used to examine whether treatment effects are a result of by differential selection 
into treatment and control groups.  
The propensity score matching procedure groups observations in clusters with similar 
propensity scores. Those who are and are no employed are then compared with respect to 
their similarity in the control variables (age, education, etc.). If the group means are not 
statistically different, the balancing properties are satisfied. In the absence of balanced 
groups, it may be difficult to make claims that a selection correction has fully taken place, 
since there are significant group differences between the group who is and is not em-
ployed. While balancing properties are not satisfied for all propensity clusters in all of the 
subgroups for which I estimate the propensity scores, I argue that these differences are not 
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as substantively problematic because of the sample restriction. For example, if there are 
age differences between the two groups within a propensity score cluster, this is not as 
problematic since the age range is already restricted to about five years.  
Therefore, a probit model estimates selection into these groups, which makes it possi-
ble to identify observations that have received treatment but are otherwise comparable to 
those who did not. My case is slightly more complex. My interest lies in examining mar-
riage effects on earnings, but earnings can only be observed for those who are in em-
ployment. Propensity score matching allows me to identify whether an individual is very 
likely to be employed, or, even more importantly, is not very likely to be employed, but 
still is in employment during the observation time. I obtain earnings propensity scores by 
estimating probit models with employment as the dependent variable. The parsimonious 
model for employment status includes age (linear and squared) and education (in years),9 
and an indicator for disability status, which distinguishes between those who are and are 
not disabled. For the German models, I also include an indicator for residence in East 
Germany. These measures reflect the employment changes or also the difficulty of find-
ing employment. Additionally, I include the natural log of household post-government in-
come in the previous year. This income measure includes household income, public trans-
fers, and benefits, minus paid taxes. I include this measure to account for the financial 
pressure of a specific household member to seek employment. These models are estimat-
ed for specific subsets of the population. Grouping variables are gender, whether or not 
there are children in the household (ranged from 0 to 4), age, and education. For the Unit-
ed States, I also estimate models separately for Whites and Nonwhites.10 For Nonwhites, I 
distinguish between Blacks and “Other” racial groups. The “other” racial group includes 
Native American, Asian, Latino,11 and other. Table 1 provides an overview over the dif-
ferent groups for which the employment models are estimated.  
 
Table 1:  Subgroups for propensity matching analyses 
Gender Parenthood Age Group Education group Race 
   United States Germany United States 
Women with children Age 22-27 0-11 years of schooling 10 years of schooling and/or 
training or less 
White 
Men without children Age 28-35 12 years of schooling 10.5 years of schooling 
and/or training 
Nonwhite 
  Age 36-45 13-15 years of schooling 11 or 11.5 years of schooling 
and/or training 
 
   16 years of schooling or more more than 11.5 years of 
schooling and/or training 
 
 
Of course, my sample of employed individuals with positive earnings will have a large 
proportion of individuals with high employment propensity scores. I use the “common 
support” option, where employed individuals, who have employment propensity scores 
                                                        
  9 The German education measure is a combination of years of schooling and vocational education. 
10 Individuals are assigned the race of the household head. Moreover, this measure does not allow me 
to identify multi-racial individuals.  
11 A separate measure allows all respondents to identify Hispanic origin, regardless of racial category, 
but it is not included in this analysis. 
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that are higher or lower than the maximum or minimum propensity scores for those who 
are not employed. The propensity matching procedure ensures that the sample of those 
who are employed is also representative of those who are not employed. In my analyses, I 
want to be able to account for the selection into employment, so I estimate separate mod-
els for whose employment propensity is at or above the median level, and for those whose 
scores are below the median.  
Each individual was assigned a specific employment propensity score in addition to 
their reported employment status. Consequently, the propensity matching procedure en-
sures that the sample of those who are employed is also representative of those who are 
not employed (see Table 2 for sample sizes). To obtain fixed effects models adjusted for 
employment propensity, I estimate separate fixed effects models for those with low and 
high employment propensity separately to examine whether selection into employment is 
at the heart of any of the observed marriage earnings differences. Those who are at or be-
low the 25th percentile of employment propensity scores are considered to have a low 
score, those with an employment propensity at or above the 75th percentile are considered 
to have a high employment propensity. These cutoff points are chosen to capture "ex-
tremes," while also ensuring a sufficient group size.  
 
Table 2:  Sample sizes by country and gender (in person-years) 
 All Low employment propensity High employment propensity 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
United States 16304 17059 2710 2786 2788 2794 
 (3390) (3339) (1170) (1232) (1145) (1166) 
Germany 12137 17140 1545 2069 1545 2069 
 (2603) (3336) (665) (859) (545) (734) 
Sweden 375 339     
 (264) (242)     
Note: Number of respondents in parentheses. 
Key outcome: Earnings 
The key outcome of interest in this study is individual labor earnings. The data from 
Germany and the United States are harmonized and includes wages and salary from all 
employment before taxes, self-employment (although in my analyses, self-employed re-
spondents are excluded), as well as income from bonuses, and overtime. These earnings 
do not include special bonuses, for example for children, and are thus a conservative 
measure of actual income. Earnings data from Sweden represent the "regular earnings, be-
fore taxes and other deductions.” This measure is annualized as respondents have the op-
tion to report hourly, weekly, monthly, and annual earnings. All analyses used the natural 
log of the earnings measure. 
Marriage 
Analyses focus on the association between marriage and earnings. I include an indicator 
of whether a respondent is married or not in any given year and a second measure that in-
dicates whether an individual is married/has been married in the current year (“married”), 
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the previous year, or the year before (“married recently”). Since those classified as “sin-
gle” include individuals who are cohabiting or are divorced, the findings are only a con-
servative estimate of the effect of heterosexual relationships on men’s and women’s earn-
ings. In supplemental analyses, I examine the impact of marriage compared to singles, 
and simultaneously compared cohabiters to singles. The observed marriage effect was not 
substantially affected, so the results are not shown. The institution of marriage varies 
across the three countries, with marriage rates highest in the United States, and age at first 
marriage highest in Sweden (Geist 2017). In models presented below, unmarried individ-
uals are the reference group.  
Key independent variable and controls 
In the earnings models estimated for the US and German data, I include three measures of 
human capital: age, experience in the labor market, and tenure at current job (all are in-
cluded in a linear and squared term). In the German data, tenure is measured in years, in 
the US data, it is measured in months. I include annual hours (in 100s) as a measure of la-
bor supply, and I further include the number of children in the model. In the Swedish 
earnings model, I include age, education, and tenure (in linear and squared terms), as well 
as the weekly hours worked. Education is included since labor market experience is not 
available. I also include an indicator for employment in the private sector (vs. the public 
sector) and the number of children. 
Results 
In a first step, I compare earnings of married and unmarried individuals of the three coun-
tries (see Table 3). I find that in Germany and Sweden, unmarried women have higher av-
erage earnings than their married counterparts, but these differences are not significant for 
women in the United States. Among men, married men have higher earnings than unmar-
ried men in all three countries.  
 
Table 3:  Average labor earnings for married and unmarried men and women  
 Women Men 
 Unmarried  Married Unmarried  Married 
United States 9.48 (3538)  9.50 (12766) 9.72 (3026)  † 10.25 (14033)  
Germany 9.67 (2387) † 9.37   (9750) 9.82 (4087) † 10.02 (13053) 
Sweden 12.01   (165) † 11.94     (210) 12.21   (171) † 12.32     (168) 
Note: † denotes that the test for group differences is significant at the .05 level. The number of observa-
tions is in parentheses. The outcome is log annual earnings, so the underlying unit is not substantively 
meaningful (log US Dollars, Euros, and Kronor).  
 
In a next step, I examine whether these differences are a result of marriage lowering 
women’s earnings and enhancing men’s, or whether these differences are in fact a result 
of selection of individuals with different underlying characteristics into marriage. I esti-
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mate fixed effects models that illustrate the effect of a change in marital changes on earn-
ings net of other unobserved characteristics. Table 4 illustrates these effects of marriage 
within individuals. Columns 1 and 3 show the immediate impact of marriage (in the cur-
rent year), and the columns 2 and 4 show short term effect of marriage, by indicating 
whether somebody entered marriage in the current or the previous two years. For Sweden, 
I only have two years available, so I can only assess the impact of entering marriage be-
tween those two years.  
 
Table 4:  The effect of marriage on earnings, net of stable respondent characteristics 
(fixed effects models, no other controls) 
 Women Men 
 Married this year Recently married Married this year Recently married 
United States 0.023 0.018 **0.127** **0.179** 
 (0.70) (0.54) (5.11) (6.95) 
     
Germany **0.199** **0.203** **0.505** **0.513** 
(4.29) (4.29) (22.39) (22.51) 
     
Sweden 0.101 0.026 0.028 0.055 
(1.11) (0.22) (0.39) (0.66) 
Note: Statistics in parentheses are t values, * p<.05, ** p<.01. See Table 1 for sample sizes and Appendix 
A for complete results.  
 
Among women, I only find marriage earnings effects in Germany. For German women, 
marriage is associated with a significant earnings boost. Marriage is not associated with 
individual earnings for women in the United States or Sweden. These results suggest that 
in Sweden, the earnings disadvantage of married women presented in Table 3 may have 
been due to the fact that singles as a group have higher earnings potential. In Germany, on 
the other hand, it seems that the earnings disadvantage observed for married women in the 
cross-sectional comparison is to be due to selection, and entering marriage actually is 
beneficial for women’s earnings.  
For men, the marriage earnings advantage shown in Table 3 persist, suggesting that 
the observed marriage earnings advantages could be a result of the actual benefits of mar-
riage for men’s earnings. In Sweden, I do not find that men’s earnings change once they 
enter marriage.  
The impact of marriage I find within individuals, however, could also be due to other 
changes in individuals’ lives. It could be that the earnings changes are a result of changes 
in labor supply, tenure, or experience. Table 5 shows marriage earnings differences ad-
justed for changes in these individual-level characteristics. As in previous models, there 
are no indications that marriage is associated with women’s earnings in the United States 
and Sweden. When taking into account changes in human capital characteristics, labor 
supply, and number of children, however, German women experience an earnings penal-
ty, net of other changes that occur in their lives. One interpretation is that the earnings bo-
nus of marriage that was documented in Table 4 is due to the fact that German women 
who marry and remain employed (rather than drop out of the labor force) are those with 
better education and better-paying jobs. Once trends in labor supply and, tenure and other 
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human capital characteristics are taken into account, the results show that everything else 
equal, marriage actually has a negative immediate impact on their earnings. 
 
Table 5:  The effect of marriage on earnings, net of stable respondent characteristics 
and changes in human capitala (fixed effects models) 
 Women  Men  
 Married this year Recently married Married this year Recently married 
United States 0.019 0.004 -0.004 0.013 
 (0.71) (0.16) (0.18) (0.57) 
Germany  *-0.110**  *-0.111**   *0.042* *0.041* 
(3.08) (3.05) (2.49) (2.41) 
Sweden 0.040 -0.045* 0.005 -0.043* 
(0.49) (0.44) (0.10) (0.71) 
Note: Statistics in parentheses are t values, * p<.05, ** p<.01. See Table 1 for sample sizes. 
aModels include controls for human capital, labor supply, and number of children. See Appendix B for 
full models. 
 
The earnings bonus of marriage for men in the United States disappears once changes in 
human capital and labor supply are taken into account, but for German men, a significant, 
albeit smaller, marriage bonus remains significant. This suggests that in Germany, mar-
riage affects men’s earnings, whereas in the United States, marriage does not have a direct 
impact. 
 
Table 6:  The effect of marriage on earnings, net of stable respondent characteristics 
and changes in human capitala by level of employment propensity (fixed 
effects models) 
 Married this year Recently married Married this year Recently married 
Women Lowb  Highb  
United States 0.159 0.063 -0.060 -0.028 
 (1.37) (0.57) (1.39) (0.66) 
Germany 0.515* 0.032 -0.126 -0.092* 
 (2.40) (0.45) (1.66) (2.07) 
Men Low  High  
United States -0.072 0.044 0.015 -0.017 
 (0.93) (0.58) (0.33) (0.35) 
Germany 0.109 -0.034 0.012 0.035 
 (1.41) (0.60) (0.18) (1.41) 
Note: Statistics in parentheses are t values, * p<.05, ** p<.01. See Table 1 for sample sizes. 
aModels include controls for human capital, labor supply, and number of children. See Appendix C for 
full models. 
bEmployment propensity scores are derived from a series of probit models that estimated the probability 
of employment. Low propensity scores are scores that are less or up to the 25th percentile of employment 
propensities with in each gender. High propensity scores are at or above the 75th percentile of scores for 
men and women respectively. 
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To assess whether these findings apply to both those who are firmly embedded in the la-
bor market and those who are less likely to be employed, I estimate the marriage effect in 
the United States and Germany separately for those with low and high employment pro-
pensities. Table 6 shows the immediate and the short-term marriage gaps after I account 
for employment propensity. The results for German women are contradictory. While em-
ployed women with a low employment propensity seem to experience a substantial im-
mediate marriage earnings bonus, there is no impact of a short-term marriage effect on 
earnings among this group. For women with high employment propensity (e.g., those with 
a high level of education and no young children), marriage is associated with an earnings 
penalty when entry into marriage in the current and previous two years is considered. For 
men, there seem to be no significant earnings effects at the extremes at the high and low 
end of employment likelihood.  
Summary and conclusions 
This study provides a thorough analysis of marriage earnings differences for men and 
women in the United States, Germany, and Sweden. I use fixed effects models to estimate 
marriage earnings effects net of unmeasured differences across those who are married and 
those who remain unmarried. I find that overall, married women have lower average earn-
ings in Germany and Sweden, but no differences can be found for US women. Married 
men have higher average earnings than single men in all three countries. This marriage 
earnings advantage persists when I examine how marriage shapes earnings within indi-
viduals, net of unmeasured stable characteristics. The fixed effects models show that mar-
riage transitions are not associated with changes in women’s earnings in the United States 
and Sweden. In Germany, however, marriage entry seems to be associated with an earn-
ings boost, if all other individual characteristics are assumed stable over time. 
However, some characteristics that are crucial in shaping individual earnings are like-
ly to change over time. In the models that adjust for possible changes in human capital 
and labor supply, I find an earnings penalty for marriage among German women, and a 
marriage earnings bonus for married men in Germany. For men in the United States, 
however, this bonus disappears when change in human capital and labor supply is taken 
into account. In the United States, married men may experience changes in human capital 
and labor supply that result in higher earnings, but earnings benefits are not a result of 
changes in marital status itself.  
In a final step, I assess marriage earnings difference for those who have very high em-
ployment propensities, and those who, even though they are employed, have a low em-
ployment propensity. The results suggest that there may be an instantaneous earnings 
boost for women with low employment propensity, but that among women who are more 
firmly attached to the labor market, there is a short-term marriage penalty. For men, I find 
no effect of marital transitions on earnings at either the high or the low end of employ-
ment likelihood.  
Several conclusions can be drawn from the results of this study. One way to interpret 
the results is that for women, marriage has no clear impact on earnings, since the cross-
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sectional earnings disadvantages of married women compared to singles are a result of the 
selection of women with lower earnings capacity and lower employment propensity into 
marriage. The men’s marriage earnings advantages are largely explained by different 
characteristics of those who marry and those who remain single, as well as different tra-
jectories in human capital and labor supply. 
In sum, one possible conclusion is to focus on the fact that there are few effects of 
earnings net of unmeasured heterogeneity, human capital, labor supply, and employment 
propensity. However, there is another interpretation of the present results.  
With respect to cross-national differences, I find that in the United States and Swe-
den, marriage has no effect on women’s earnings, but in Germany, I find evidence that 
entering marriage reduces earnings. In an addition to the literature on marriage and earn-
ings, I further adjust for employment propensity. Women who enter marriage in Germany 
have lower employment propensity, which is associated with lower earnings, and the mar-
riage earnings penalty for women was a reflection of this difference. For German men, the 
immediate earnings benefit associated with marriage is more robust even when the fact 
that men who marry also have a higher employment propensity (and consequently a high-
er earnings propensity). The results do suggest that the conservative policy context that 
has supported traditional marriage centered on a male breadwinner family may be respon-
sible for these earnings benefits for German men. In contrast, in Sweden, where pressures 
to enter marriage are rather small and there is no emphasis on the male breadwinner, men 
experience no marriage earnings advantage, not even without a selection correction.  
 
This study is not without limitations. While my analyses contain some selection correc-
tions, including the selection into employment, the use of fixed effects measures only 
provides an imperfect correction to the possible selection into marriage, and the issue of 
causality is not resolved. Data limitations do not allow for a more fine-grained assessment 
of the causality of the relationship akin to Killewald and Lundberg (2017). Additionally, 
the comparisons presented here are based on legal marriage, rather than cohabitation be-
tween partners. Cohabitation is more common in Sweden compared to the United States 
and Germany, as well as the extent to which being in a relationship impacts the division 
of labor in the household, work effort, or the level of discrimination experienced in the 
work place. The earnings effects are not fully work-time standardized, in part due to the 
country differences in the measurement of work time. Moreover, the goal for this study is 
not to identify the effect of marriage net of housework time, which is closely linked to 
time spent in in employment. Sobel (2012) goes as far as shedding doubt on the use of 
traditional fixed effects methods for estimating marriage earnings effects altogether, since 
important time varying confounders such as substance abuse, depression, etc. are not 
commonly available alongside high quality earnings measures, let alone over time. This 
study also cannot capture the considerable variability in the way men and women per-
ceive and express their masculinity, both among men and women and across countries. 
The study’s limit to those who are cisgender and heterosexual enables us to rely on tradi-
tional notion of the meaning of marriage and behavioral expectations towards husbands 
and wives. 
These limitations notwithstanding, one key finding of this study are the initial results 
of how earnings differ between those who are married and those who are not. Even if the 
causal relationship cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt and the mechanisms 
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remain unclear, these differences matter in the people’s live experiences. Earnings disad-
vantages of married women compared to single women may largely be due to selection, 
but for men, there is stronger evidence that, at least in Germany, entering marriage in-
creases men’s earnings. The results suggest that marriage is a family institution yet also a 
stratifying factor. While marriage itself may not have a clear causal impact on earnings, 
earnings differences between those who are married and unmarried highlight that changes 
in economic circumstances and marriage at least co-occur. Existing research has shown 
that married women have higher household income yet, and in times of marriage instabil-
ity, reduced individual earnings may put women at risk in the long term. Additional re-
search needs to distinguish between immediate and the short-term effect of marriage en-
try. Examining those nuances more closely will help us further understand the gendered 
institution of marriage across contexts. Future research needs to explore how gendered 
patterns of labor force participation in conjunction with marriage transitions reflect gen-
der equality. 
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Appendix A:  Baseline fixed effects models for the United States, Germany, and Sweden 
US  Women Men 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married  0.023  0.127**  
 (0.70)  (5.11)  
Recently Married   0.018  0.179** 
  (0.54)  (6.95) 
Constant 9.481** 9.485** 10.051** 10.006** 
 (360.00) (356.77) (483.80) (458.56) 
Observations 16304 16304 17059 17059 
Respondents 3390 3390 3339 3339 
R-squared <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
 
Germany Women  Men  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married  0.199**  0.505**  
 (4.29)  (22.39)  
Recently Married   0.203**  0.513** 
  (4.29)  (22.51) 
Constant 9.275** 9.272** 9.590** 9.583** 
 (247.19) (242.82) (552.48) (545.59) 
Observations 12137 12137 17140 17140 
Respondents 2603 2603 3336 3336 
R-squared <0.001 <0.001 0.04 0.04 
 
Sweden  Women  Men  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married  0.101 0.026 0.028 0.055 
 (1.11) (0.22) (0.39) (0.66) 
Cohabiting  -0.096  0.039 
  (1.03)  (0.63) 
Constant 11.914** 11.978** 12.252** 12.230** 
 (227.45) (147.24) (333.96) (239.04) 
Observations 375 375 339 339 
Respondents 264 264 242 242 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 <0.001 0.01 
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Appendix B: Fixed effects models with individual level controls for the United States, 
Germany, and Sweden 
 United States Germany 
 Women  Men  Women  Men  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married 0.019  -0.004  -0.110**  0.042*  
 (0.71)  (0.18)  (3.08)  (2.49)  
Recently married  0.004  0.013  -0.111**  0.041* 
 (0.16)  (0.57)  (3.05)  (2.41) 
Age -0.029 -0.028 0.046 0.045 0.008 0.008 0.049** 0.049** 
 (1.56) (1.49) (1.31) (1.29) (0.57) (0.58) (3.38) (3.39) 
Age squared 0.001** 0.001** -0.001 -0.001 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (4.98) (4.94) (1.95) (1.93) (5.48) (5.47) (0.03) (0.03) 
Experience 0.055** 0.055** 0.061** 0.061** 0.028** 0.028** 0.047** 0.047** 
 (5.02) (4.95) (2.96) (2.94) (2.71) (2.71) (3.71) (3.71) 
Exp. squared  -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (7.56) (7.55) (0.39) (0.41) (5.76) (5.75) (6.64) (6.64) 
Tenure 0.005** 0.005** 0.003** 0.003** 0.009** 0.009** 0.002 0.002 
 (17.39) (17.38) (11.28) (11.28) (3.91) (3.91) (1.16) (1.16) 
Ten. Squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* 
(12.65) (12.64) (7.56) (7.55) (4.12) (4.12) (2.48) (2.47) 
Ann. work hrs. 0.059** 0.059** 0.031** 0.031** 0.038** 0.038** 0.021** 0.021** 
(72.01) (71.98) (43.78) (43.77) (45.00) (44.98) (38.19) (38.19) 
Number of Children -0.062** -0.062** 0.013 0.013 -0.030** -0.030** 0.014** 0.014** 
(6.65) (6.63) (1.74) (1.69) (3.04) (3.03) (3.14) (3.16) 
Constant 7.678** 7.665** 7.791** 7.792** 7.156** 7.155** 7.178** 7.178** 
 (24.50) (24.45) (14.95) (14.95) (28.35) (28.35) (26.74) (26.73) 
Observations 16304 16304 17059 17059 12137 12137 17140 17140 
# of resp. 3390 3390 3339 3339 2603 2603 3336 3336 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.21 0.21 0.45 0.45 0.52 0.52 
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Appendix B: Fixed effects models with individual level controls for the United States, 
Germany, and Sweden 
Sweden Women  Men  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married 0.040 -0.045 0.005 -0.043 
 (0.49) (0.44) (0.10) (0.71) 
Private sector employment 0.323* 0.326* 0.205* 0.207* 
 (2.47) (2.50) (2.30) (2.33) 
Cohabiting  -0.111  -0.070 
  (1.38)  (1.46) 
Age 0.108 0.092 0.114 0.130 
 (1.08) (0.92) (1.70) (1.92) 
Tenure -0.009 -0.012 0.025 0.023 
 (0.54) (0.71) (1.84) (1.66) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.33) (0.17) (1.01) (1.19) 
Tenure squared 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.19) (0.34) (1.09) (1.01) 
Education (in years) -0.019 -0.023 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.78) (0.95) (0.37) (0.20) 
Weekly hours worked 0.015** 0.015** 0.019** 0.020** 
 (4.04) (4.13) (6.23) (6.40) 
Number of children 0.010 0.011 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.23) (0.25) (0.49) (0.27) 
Constant 8.318** 8.750** 8.494** 8.167** 
 (4.56) (4.75) (7.38) (7.01) 
Observations 375 375 339 339 
Number of respondents 264 264 242 242 
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.53 0.54 
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Appendix C: Separate fixed effects models for men and women with low and high 
employment propensity scores (United States and Germany) 
United States Women Low Women High Men Low  Men High  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married 0.159  -0.060  -0.072  0.015  
 (1.37)  (1.39)  (0.93)  (0.33)  
Recent marriage  0.063  -0.028  0.044  -0.017 
  (0.57)  (0.66)  (0.58)  (0.35) 
Age -0.020 -0.018 0.125 0.117 0.418** 0.410** -0.071 -0.065 
 (0.22) (0.20) (1.96) (1.82) (3.71) (3.63) (0.70) (0.65) 
Age squared 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006** -0.005** -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.37) (1.34) (1.48) (1.42) (3.55) (3.46) (0.42) (0.46) 
Experience -0.020 -0.018 0.022 0.027 -0.128* -0.129* 0.175* 0.174* 
 (0.42) (0.38) (0.58) (0.71) (2.28) (2.29) (2.34) (2.32) 
Exp. squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.004** 0.004** -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.54) (0.55) (0.00) (0.01) (3.24) (3.23) (0.69) (0.69) 
Tenure 0.007** 0.007** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.001* 0.001* 
 (6.11) (6.08) (4.33) (4.33) (2.90) (2.88) (2.34) (2.34) 
Tenure squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (4.61) (4.59) (2.98) (2.98) (1.08) (1.06) (1.05) (1.07) 
Ann. work hrs. 0.065** 0.065** 0.046** 0.046** 0.051** 0.051** 0.013** 0.013** 
 (24.85) (24.82) (24.04) (24.08) (22.19) (22.15) (7.09) (7.08) 
Number of children -0.087** -0.085** -0.022 -0.021 0.037 0.023 0.045* 0.046* 
(2.62) (2.59) (0.70) (0.69) (1.25) (0.84) (2.02) (2.05) 
Constant 7.054** 7.095** 6.077** 6.210** 1.694 1.764 10.537** 10.463** 
 (4.99) (5.02) (6.09) (6.18) (1.01) (1.05) (6.71) (6.67) 
Observations 2710 2710 2788 2788 2786 2786 2794 2794 
Number of re-
spondents 1170 1170 1145 1145 1232 1232 1166 1166 
R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.35 0.35 0.29 0.29 0.15 0.15 
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Appendix C: Separate fixed effects models for men and women with low and high 
employment propensity scores (United States and Germany) 
Germany Women Low Women High Men Low  Men High  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Married 0.515*  0.109  -0.126  0.012  
 (2.40)  (1.41)  (1.66)  (0.18)  
Recent marriage -0.130 -0.102 -0.180 -0.170 -0.211** -0.212** 0.096 0.100 
 (1.73) (1.38) (1.85) (1.76) (3.27) (3.31) (0.83) (0.86) 
Age 0.003** 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002** -0.002** 
 (2.69) (2.40) (1.35) (1.28) (1.57) (1.66) (3.25) (3.40) 
Age squared 0.039 0.030 0.230** 0.226** 0.262** 0.257** 0.143 0.147 
 (0.89) (0.68) (3.13) (3.07) (6.05) (5.95) (1.29) (1.32) 
Experience -0.001 -0.000 -0.003** -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.77) (0.62) (2.86) (2.87) (3.47) (3.35) (2.76) (2.75) 
Exp. squared 0.020* 0.021* 0.007 0.007 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011** -0.011** 
 (2.11) (2.19) (1.04) (1.03) (0.27) (0.30) (2.77) (2.77) 
Tenure -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.84) (1.94) (2.32) (2.35) (0.08) (0.09) (1.44) (1.45) 
Tenure squared 0.047** 0.047** 0.030** 0.030** 0.021** 0.021** 0.008** 0.008** 
 (15.58) (15.51) (15.09) (15.08) (10.85) (11.03) (5.21) (5.24) 
Ann. work hrs. 0.037 0.046 0.052 0.054 0.008 -0.000 0.017 0.021 
 (1.04) (1.32) (1.78) (1.85) (0.22) (0.01) (1.20) (1.45) 
Number of children  0.032  -0.034  -0.092*  0.035 
 (0.45)  (0.60)  (2.07)  (1.41) 
Constant 8.694** 8.660** 10.998** 10.872** 12.332** 12.300** 6.884** 6.832** 
 (6.78) (6.72) (6.62) (6.55) (10.83) (10.81) (2.96) (2.94) 
Observations 1545 1545 2069 2069 1545 1545 2069 2069 
Number of re-
spondents 665 665 859 859 545 545 734 734 
R-squared 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.51 0.51 
 
 
 
 
